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Abstract 
Background: Laboratory tasks to delineate anxiety disorder features are used to refine 
classification and inform our understanding of etiological mechanisms. The present study 
examines laboratory measures of response inhibition, specifically the inhibition of a prepotent 
motor response, in clinical anxiety. Data on associations between anxiety and response inhibition 
remain inconsistent, perhaps because of dissociable effects of clinical anxiety and 
experimentally-manipulated state anxiety. Few studies directly assess the independent and 
interacting effects of these two anxiety types (state vs. disorder) on response inhibition. The 
current study accomplished this goal, by manipulating state anxiety in healthy and clinically 
anxious individuals while they complete a response inhibition task.  
Methods: The study employs the threat-of-shock paradigm, one of the best-established 
manipulations for robustly increasing state anxiety. Participants included 82 adults (41 healthy; 
41 patients with an anxiety disorder). A go/nogo task with highly frequent go trials was 
administered during alternating periods of safety and shock threat. Signal detection theory was 
used to quantify response bias and signal-detection sensitivity.  
Results: There were independent effects of anxiety and clinical anxiety on response inhibition. 
In both groups, heightened anxiety facilitated response inhibition, leading to reduced nogo 
commission errors. Compared to the healthy group, clinical anxiety was associated with 
excessive response inhibition and increased go omission errors in both the safe and threat 
conditions.  
Conclusions: Response inhibition and its impact on go omission errors appear to be a promising 
behavioral marker of clinical anxiety. These results have implications for a dimensional view of 
clinical anxiety. 
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Introduction  
The National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative seeks 
to uncover transdiagnosis, biobehavioral dimensions related to specific neurobiological 
processes, as quantified with laboratory tasks (Insel et al., 2010). From this perspective, anxiety 
disorders are conceptualized as extreme variants of normal functioning. A key question therefore 
is to determine the extent to which adaptive and maladaptive responses to threats vary as a 
function of clinical and non-clinical variations in anxiety (Robinson et al., 2015). The present 
study examines the effects of both experimentally-induced and clinical anxiety on one such 
response, behavioral inhibition or response inhibition, operationally defined as the inhibition of 
prepotent motor responses (Bari and Robbins, 2013) (as opposed to cognitive inhibition, the 
inhibition of thoughts, emotions, and perception, which is impaired in clinical anxiety (Eysenck 
et al., 2007)).  
Works in rodents led Gray to suggest that anxiety activates the behavioral inhibition 
system, which triggers a set of defensive responses, including inhibition of prepotent responses 
(i.e., response inhibition) (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). Others proposed that excessive 
engagement of the behavioral inhibition system in humans contributes to clinical anxiety 
(Epstein et al., 2001, Gray and McNaughton, 2000, Quay, 1997, Sylwan, 2004). However, few 
studies have examined how experimentally-induced and clinical anxiety relates to laboratory 
measures of response inhibition in humans. Moreover, the limited data that do exist are 
conflicting, with studies finding inconsistent effects of clinical anxiety, trait anxiety, and 
manipulations in state anxiety (Daugherty et al., 1993, Forster and Lavie, 2014, Geen, 1985, 
Hagopian and Ollendick, 1994, Karch et al., 2008, Kooijmans et al., 2000, Li et al., 2009, Neo et 
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al., 2011, Oosterlaan and Sergeant, 1996, Righi et al., 2009, Robinson et al., 2013a, Sehlmeyer 
et al., 2010, Wright et al., 2014).   
The Sustained Response to Attention Task is a go/nogo paradigm (GNG) that generates a 
measure of response inhibition (Helton, 2009, Peebles and Bothell, 2004). This paradigm 
requires a motor response to frequent ‘go’ target stimuli but not rare ‘nogo’ stimuli, to which a 
response is withheld. Such withholding of a prepotent response generates a prototypical index of 
response inhibition (Bari and Robbins, 2013, Helton, 2009). Consistent with Gray’s model, we 
recently showed that heightened state anxiety induced by threat of shock facilitates response 
inhibition during GNG, i.e., it reduced nogo commission errors (failure to inhibit the prepotent 
response) without affecting go response time (Robinson et al., 2013a). We also found, in a recent 
replication and extension of this finding, a positive correlation between state anxiety and go 
omission errors; individuals with the highest elevation in state anxiety showed improved nogo 
accuracy but also impaired go accuracy (Grillon et al., 2016). These results suggest that high 
state anxiety is associated with an overall inhibition of motor responding, a hypothesis that was 
confirmed in a subsequent reanalysis of these data using signal detection theory to quantify 
changes in response bias (McVay and Kane, 2009, Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988).  
 These data show that heightened state anxiety induced by threat of shock drives a transient 
response inhibition tendency with beneficial and detrimental effects depending on the nature of 
the response (i.e., improved nogo responses, impaired go responses). However, these data 
emerged only from variations in normal anxiety. This raises questions on the relationships 
among variations in response inhibition, threat-induced state anxiety, and clinical levels of 
anxiety. Although data in children find some evidence of associations between response 
inhibition and clinical anxiety (Daugherty et al., 1993, Kooijmans et al., 2000, Oosterlaan and 
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Sergeant, 1996), little is known about this link in adults (Beutel et al., 2010, Thomas et al., 
2016).  
Investigations of the effect of trait anxiety on response inhibition can inform predictions. 
Most studies found no behavioral effect of trait anxiety in GNG (Karch et al., 2008, Righi et al., 
2009, Sehlmeyer et al., 2010) or stop-signal tasks (Li et al., 2009, Neo et al., 2011). However, 
there is indirect evidence that when state anxiety is elevated, high trait anxiety is also associated 
with increased nogo accuracy, but at the expense of go accuracy (Geen, 1985, Hagopian and 
Ollendick, 1994). These results suggest that state and trait anxiety drive a response inhibition 
tendency along a continuum from “normal” to “abnormal”. Given that clinical anxiety is 
characterized by both high state and trait anxiety, one could then hypothesize that response 
inhibition would be excessive in clinical anxiety.  
To test this possibility, we compared the effect of threat of shock during GNG performance 
in individuals with clinical anxiety and in heathy participants. We focused on generalized anxiety 
disorder and social anxiety disorder, two conditions with an overly sensitive behavioral 
inhibition system (Gray and McNaughton, 2000, Maack et al., 2012, Morgan et al., 2009, 
Roelofs et al., 2009, Rosenbaum et al., 1991). We expected both heightened state anxiety and 
clinical anxiety to shift response bias (McVay and Kane, 2009, Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988) 
away from the prepotent go response (towards nogo response, i.e., response inhibition tendency), 
but to a greater extent in clinical anxiety. Excessive response inhibition in clinical anxiety could 
be a disease characteristic. One would then expect increased response inhibition in the patients 
compared to the healthy participants in both the safe and the threat conditions. Alternatively, 
excessive response inhibition in the patients could be state-dependent, i.e., arising from elevated 
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state anxiety during threat processing. If so, excessive response inhibition in the patients vs. 
healthy participants would be seen only during shock anticipation. 
Because heightened state anxiety facilitates perceptual processes (Baas et al., 2006, 
Cornwell et al., 2007), we also expected signal detection to be facilitated by the threat of shock. 
Tasks such as GNG, usually promote a speed-accuracy trade-off with slower reaction time (RT) 
being correlated with better nogo accuracy (Peebles and Bothell, 2004). However, our previous 
results showed that heightened state anxiety improved nogo accuracy without affecting go RT, 
i.e., independently of a speed-accuracy trade-off (Robinson et al., 2013b). To control for 
individual differences in RT, a skill index was also computed (nogo accuracy/go-trial RT) 
(Saucedo Marquez et al., 2013, Seli, 2016, Seli et al., 2016). This index provides a measure of 
efficiency by accounting for both response speed and accuracy. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 41 medication-free patients (34 female) and 41 healthy participants 
(34 female). Following an initial telephone screen, participants visited the NIH for 
comprehensive screening by a clinician. The patients had a diagnosis of generalized anxiety 
disorders (GAD, N=14), social anxiety disorder (SAD, N=7), or GAD and comorbid SAD 
(N=20) and no other current Axis I psychiatric disorders, or past psychosis as assessed by the 
SCID-I/P (First et al., 2002). The healthy participants had no current or past history of any Axis I 
psychiatric disorders as assessed by SCID-I/NP. Exclusion criteria for all participants consisted 
of any interfering acute or chronic medical conditions and positive urine drug screen. All 
participants gave written informed consent approved by the NIMH Combined Neuroscience 
Institutional Review Board. The study was registered at clinical-trials.gov (no. NCT00055224). 
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Overview 
We used a procedure modeled after one of our previous studies (Grillon et al., 2016), as 
described in Figure 1. Briefly, subjects participated in a task (GNG) and no-task (see below) 
condition during periods of threat of shocks and periods of safety when no shock could be 
administered. This resulted in a 2 (healthy participants, anxiety patients) x 2 (task, no task) x 2 
(safe, threat) design. Acoustic startle stimuli used to produce a startle response, operationally 
defined as an eyeblink reflex, were regularly delivered throughout testing to assess subjects’ 
defensive reactivity. Subjects’ anxiety was assessed via retrospective reports.  
Procedure 
Shortly after participants’ arrival on the testing day, a startle habituation procedure was 
conducted. For this, two electrodes were attached under the left eye to record the eyeblink/startle 
reflex. Nine startle stimuli were then delivered every 18–25 s to reduce initial startle reactivity. 
This was followed by a shock work-up procedure that set the shock intensity at a level that was 
uncomfortable but not painful. Shock levels (Table 1) did not differ significantly between the 
two groups ((t(80)=.8, ns, d=.2). The GNG task was then initiated.  
Go/nogo (GNG) and control task  
During the GNG and the control tasks, stimuli were presented on a monitor. In the GNG 
task, participants were asked to respond to frequent (91%) “go” stimuli (“=”) by pressing the “2” 
on the keypad of a computer keyboard and to withhold their response to infrequent (9%) “nogo” 
stimuli (“O”). They were asked to focus on speed and accuracy equally. In the control task, 
frequent “*” (91%) and infrequent “#” (9%) stimuli were presented and participants were asked 
to look passively at the screen. In both the GNG and control tasks, these stimuli were randomly 
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distributed and were presented for 250 ms at a rate of one every 2000 ms. Stimuli were presented 
on a blank screen and were not followed by a mask. A correct go hit was a response recorded 
during these 2000 ms to a go trial. Similarly, a correct nogo omission was a no response during 
the same period to a nogo trial.  
Four sequences of stimulus presentation, with each sequence consisting of 8 blocks, were 
created: 1) sequence 1 (Fig. 1): no task (threat then safe), task (threat then safe), no task (threat 
then safe), task (threat then safe); 2) sequence 2 was similar to sequence 1 but no task and task 
conditions were reversed: 3) Sequence 3 was similar to sequence 1 but threat and safe were 
reversed: 4) sequence 4 was similar to sequence 1 but no task and task, and safe and threat were 
reversed. Each participant was presented with one of the following two sequences (1 and 2, 2 and 
1, 4 and 3, or 3 and 4) with approximately equal numbers of subjects per sequence pairs. In each 
block, the frequent stimuli (“=” or “*”) were presented on 45 occasions while the infrequent 
stimuli (“O” or “#”) occurred five times for a total of 720 (45 x 8 blocks x 2 sequences) go trials 
and (5 x 8 x 2) 80 nogo trials over the two sequences. Each block lasted 100 s (50 x 2000 ms). 
Startle stimuli, shocks, and threat condition 
The first block of each sequence was preceded by three startle stimuli to further reduce 
initial startle reactivity. Subsequently, three startle stimuli separated by 22-30 sec were delivered 
in each block to assess participants’ anxiety. Startle stimuli always occurred between two go 
trials and go trials that followed a startle stimulus were not included in the analysis. A shock was 
delivered in two of the four threat blocks in each sequence, just prior to the last go trial, which 
was not included in the analysis (for a total of 4 shocks).  Participants were informed that shock 
could be administered only in the threat condition and never in the safe condition. The safe and 
threat conditions were signaled by a blue and red border on the monitor, respectively.  
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Subjective anxiety & Thought probes 
At the end of each safe and threat block of a sequence, subjects were asked to report their 
level of anxiety during the preceding block on an analog scale ranging from to 1 “not at all 
anxious” to 10 “extremely anxious”.  
Tasks such as GNG are also used to explore task-related thoughts and task-unrelated 
thoughts (Seli, 2016). At the end of each block, just prior to assessing subjective anxiety, 
participants were asked to indicate whether they were focused on the task (task-related thoughts) 
or whether they were mind-wandering with task-unrelated, whether threat-related or threat-
unrelated, thoughts. In this study, as in our past study (Robinson et al., 2013a), we found no 
reliable correlations between task-unrelated thoughts and GNG performance. Consequently, the 
thought probe methodology and the results are presented in Supplementary Materials. 
Stimulation and Physiological Responses 
Stimulation and recording were controlled by a commercial system (Contact Precision 
Instruments, UK). Presentation of the visual stimuli was controlled by E-Prime. The acoustic 
startle stimulus was a 40-ms duration 103-dB (A) white noise presented via headphones. The 
eyeblink reflex was recorded with two electrodes placed under the left eye and a ground 
electrode placed on the left arm. The electromyographic eyeblink signal was amplified with 
bandwidth set to 30–500 Hz and digitized at a rate of 1000 Hz. Finally, the shock was 
administered on the left wrist. 
Anxiety & response inhibition 
 
10 
 
Data Analysis 
Performance 
Correct go responses were go trials followed by button press. Correct nogo responses were 
nogo trials followed by no button press. Performance was determined for each condition (threat, 
safe) and trial type (go, nogo) by dividing the number of correct response by the total number of 
each trial type. The trial following a shock was excluded from analyses. Mean RT was calculated 
for correct-go to evaluate speed-accuracy trade-off (Peebles and Bothell, 2004). In addition, go 
RT variability (standard error) and RT coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean RT) 
were also calculated as these measures reflect the ability to sustain attention across trials (Stuss 
et al., 1995).  
Signal-detection sensitivity (dL) and response bias (CL) scores were calculated for each 
participant as done by others (McVay and Kane, 2009) using the formulas for logistic 
distributions (Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988) (see details in Supplemental Materials).  
 The skill index was calculated as:  
Skill index = 1000*(mean nogo accuracy ratio/ mean go-trial RT) (Saucedo Marquez et 
al., 2013, Seli, 2016, Seli et al., 2016). (The index is multiplied by 1000 to reduce the number of 
decimals (Seli, 2016)). 
Startle reflex 
After full-wave rectification and smoothing the EMG signal, peak startle/eyeblink 
magnitude was determined in the 20–100-ms timeframe following stimulus onset relative to a 
50-ms pre-stimulus baseline. The startle responses from each participant were converted to t-
scores. 
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Data were analyzed with mixed-model repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
and t-tests. Cohen’s d and partial eta-squared (ȠP2) are reported for effect sizes. Preliminary 
analyses showed no significant order effects of the sequence of stimulus presentation on the key 
variables. 
Results 
Demographic 
The demographic data are presented in Table 1. The two groups did not differ in age 
(t(80)=1.2, ns). As expected, the patients had higher scores of state anxiety (t(80)=8.3, p<.0009, 
d = 1.8), trait anxiety (t(80)=12.6, p<.0009, d=2.6), and BDI (t(79)=5.9, p<.0009, d=1.3 ) 
compared to the healthy participants. Note that BDI of one subject was missing in the patient 
group. 
Performance 
Each performance score (CL, dL, nogo accuracy, go accuracy, go RT, go RT-coefficient of 
variation, and skill index) was analyzed using analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with group 
(healthy participants, anxiety patients) as a between-subject factor and condition (safe, threat) as 
a within-subject factor.  
As expected given the nature of the task, the response bias index (CL) was negative (Fig. 2, 
left), reflecting a “go” bias (McVay et al., 2013). Consistent with our hypothesis, the go bias was 
reduced (i.e., increased nogo bias) in the threat compared to the safe condition (F(1,80)=6.5, 
p=.01, ȠP2=.075), and in the patients compared to the healthy participants (F(1,80)=4.4, p=.04, 
ȠP2=.052). However, these effects did not interact with one another (condition x group: 
F(1,80)=1.4, ns, ȠP2=.017). The group difference remained unchanged when BDI was used as a 
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covariate (group main effect: F(1,78)=5.8, p=.02, ȠP2=.069). Thus, both heightened state anxiety 
and clinical anxiety independently resulted in greater nogo biases, leading the nogo response bias 
to be lowest in the controls/safe condition and greatest in the patients/threat condition (Fig. 2, 
left).. 
The signal-detection sensitivity index (dL) was higher in the threat compared to the safe 
condition (condition: F(1,80)=14.1, p<.001, ȠP2=.149), reflecting better perceptual 
discrimination during heightened state anxiety (Fig. 2, right). There was also a trend for larger dL 
in the healthy participants compared to the patients (group: F(1,80)=3.5, p=.066, ȠP2=.041), but 
this trend disappeared when BDI was used as a covariate (F(1,78)=1.9, ns, ȠP2=.023). The 
condition x group effect was not significant (p>.1).  
Nogo accuracy, go accuracy, skill index, go RT and go RT-variability are presented in 
Table 2. Nogo accuracy did not differ significantly among the healthy participants and patients 
(F(1,80)=.04, ns, ȠP2=.0005), but it was higher (less commission errors) in the threat compared 
to the safe condition, with a similar threat effect in both groups (condition: F(1,80)=12.5, p=.001, 
ȠP2=.135; condition x group: F(1,80=.03, ns, ȠP2=.0004). Go accuracy was lower (i.e., increased 
omission errors) in the patients compared to the healthy participants (F(1,80)=4.5, p=.04, 
ȠP2=.054), but it was not affected by threat (condition: F(1,80)=.05, ns, ȠP2=.0006; condition x 
group: F(1,80)=.4, ns, ȠP2=.004). The Go accuracy group difference remained significant after 
controlling for depression symptoms (F(1,78=5.4, .02, ȠP2=.064). 
Go RT was faster in the patients compared to the healthy participants (F(1,80)=6.0, p=.02, 
ȠP2=.07). No other go RT effects were significant (all p>.05). Go RT-variability was smaller in 
the patients compared to the healthy participants (F(1,80)=4.9, p=.03, ȠP2=.058), and in the 
threat compared to the safe condition across both groups (F(1,80)=10.3, p=.002, ȠP2=.114). The 
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difference between the threat and safe condition remained significant after controlling for 
individual differences in RT (coefficient of variation) (F(1,80)=8.7, p=.004, ȠP2=.099), but the 
group difference did not (Group: F(1,80)=1.8, ns, ȠP2=.23; Group x Condition: F(1,80)=.6, ns, 
ȠP2=.006). The group differences in go RT and go RT variability remained significant when BDI 
was used as a covariate (F(1,78)=6.4, .01,  ȠP2=.07 and F(1,78)=6.8, .01, ȠP2=.08, respectively). 
 The skill index was larger in the patient group compared to the control group 
(F(1,80)=5.9, p=.017, ȠP2=.068) and in the threat compared to the safe condition ( F(1,80)=16.5, 
p<.0009, ȠP2=.171) without significant group x condition interaction ( F(1,80)=.1,ns, 
ȠP2=.00004). The group difference in skill index remained significant when BDI was used as a 
covariate (F(1,78)=9.3, p=.003, ȠP2=.10). 
 
Startle reflex & subjective anxiety  
Analysis of the startle data with raw scores and T-score led to similar results. The raw 
scores are presented here (Fig 3, top) and the t-scores in Supplementary Materials (Fig. 1s). 
These data were analyzed with a group (healthy participants, anxiety patients) x task (control 
task, GNG) x condition (safe, threat) ANOVA. Startle magnitude was larger in the threat 
compared to the safe condition (i.e., fear-potentiated startle: F(1,80)=77.1, p<.0009, ȠP2=.49) and 
in the no task compared to the GNG task condition (F(1,80)=19.9, p<.0009, ȠP2=.19), but these 
effects were qualified by 1) a group x condition interaction (F(1,80)=4.6, p=.03, ȠP2=.05), 
reflecting greater fear-potentiated startle in the patients compared to the healthy participants, and 
2) a task x condition interaction (F(1,80)=4.2, p=.04, ȠP2=.05), due to reduced fear-potentiated 
startle in the GNG task compared to the no task.  The group x condition interaction remained 
significant when BDI was used as a covariate (F(1,78)=12.2, p=.001, ȠP2=.13), 
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Subjective anxiety (Fig 3, bottom) was higher overall in the patients compared to the 
healthy participants (F(1,80)=9.0, p=.003, ȠP2=.102) (including after controlling for BDI, 
(F(1,78)=4.7, p=.03, ȠP2=.12), in the threat compared to the safe condition (F(1,80)=76.2, 
p<.0009, ȠP2=.488), and (at trend) in the control task compared to the GNG task (F(1,80)=3.7, 
p=.057, ȠP2=.446). No interaction was significant (all p>.1). 
Discussion  
This study examined the interacting effects of state and clinical anxiety on response 
inhibition. As predicted, clinical anxiety was associated with excessive response inhibition, as 
measured by the signal-detection response bias index (CL), leading to decreased go accuracy. 
This effect was independent of the threat manipulation. These findings suggest that clinical 
anxiety is associated with over activation of an adaptive defense mechanism (i.e., the behavioral 
inhibition system) that promotes an excessive response inhibition tendency, leading to a 
maladaptive behavioral effect (i.e., impaired go performance). This maladaptive behavior is a 
marker of the disease rather than the result of excessive state anxiety arising from an actual 
threat. 
The finding that threat of shock in the healthy participants improved nogo accuracy 
without affecting go accuracy or go RT replicates and extends our original study (Robinson et 
al., 2013a).  The signal-detection analysis suggests that two factors contributed to this 
improvement. First, the response bias index CL indicated that heightened state anxiety decreased 
go tendency (i.e., increased nogo tendency), aligning behavior preferentially with the task of 
stopping the motor response on nogo trials. Second, heightened state anxiety improved signal-
detection sensitivity (dL), probably leading to better target discrimination. This latter effect is 
consistent with findings that heightened state anxiety facilitates early perceptual and sensory 
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processing (Baas et al., 2006, Cornwell et al., 2007, Pessoa et al., 2012, Vuilleumier, 2005). 
These sensory effects may have facilitated stimulus detection, also contributing to improved 
nogo accuracy (Smallwood, 2013). 
Successful performance during GNG tasks did not depend solely on response inhibition. 
For example, it also involves changes in response strategy. However, the result that RT was not 
affected by heightened state anxiety indicates two points: participants (including the anxiety 
patients) did not adopt a more deliberate, cautious and controlled response strategy (Gold and 
Shadlen, 2007) and improved nogo performance did not come at the expense of efficiency 
(Eysenck et al., 2007), which would be reflected in a speed-accuracy trade-off (i.e., slower RT) 
(Peebles and Bothell, 2004). Rather, the skill index indicated superior nogo performance 
efficiency during the threat condition when RT was taken into account to evaluate nogo 
performance.  
Clinical anxiety, like heightened state anxiety, increased response inhibition based on 
response bias index (Fig 2, left). In healthy participants, the GNG task promoted a strong go 
prepotency in innocuous context (safe condition), which resulted in a low response inhibition 
tendency that increased the likelihood of nogo commission errors. As state anxiety was 
heightened in the healthy participants (threat condition) and in the anxiety patients (safe and 
threat conditions), response inhibition increased. This facilitated stopping on nogo trials in both 
groups, but increased go omission errors in the patients. Thus, consistent with Gray’s models 
(Epstein et al., 2001, Gray and McNaughton, 2000, Quay, 1997, Sylwan, 2004), a transient 
increase in response inhibition under threat is normative, but excessive response inhibition 
characterizes clinical anxiety. This excessive behavioral inhibition in anxiety patients has 
beneficial effects such as superior nogo performance (based on the skill index scores), but it is 
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also detrimental for go accuracy, compared to the healthy participants. The exact implication of 
these findings remains to be determined.  A key question is how increased response inhibition 
relates to maladaptive behaviors, such as avoidance and fearful inhibited temperament, which is 
characterized by a behavioral inhibition phenotype (Buss et al., 2004, Kagan et al., 1988)? 
Indeed it is likely context dependent, increased inhibition could be adaptive in the face of threat, 
but it could be maladaptive in the face of positive outcomes. Future work should explore the 
impact of inhibitory processes across valenced outcomes. 
During go trials, a balance is established between prepotent go responses and the need to 
adjust motor readiness in anticipation of stopping the response on nogo trials (i.e., proactive 
response inhibition) (Aron, 2011). The go results point to excessive proactive response inhibition 
in clinical anxiety. However, one could alternatively argue that the anxiety patients failed to 
develop prepotent go responses. This explanation is unlikely given that 1) RT was faster in the 
patients compared to the healthy participants and 2) it is inconsistent with the literature that show 
no detrimental effect of anxiety on prepotent responses. For example, eye movement studies 
show no impairment in pro-saccade, a prepotent response, in trait anxious individuals (Ansari 
and Derakshan, 2011, Ansari et al., 2008). In addition, acute and chronic stress promote rather 
than impair the development of habit behaviors and prepotent responses in humans and in 
animals (Kim et al., 2001, Schwabe et al., 2008, Schwabe and Wolf, 2009).  
The present findings have several implications. First, organisms need to react adaptively to 
threat with a set of behavioral adjustments including attentional bias towards threat, increased 
arousal and negative affect, and behavioral inhibition. Clinical anxiety has long been associated 
with attentional bias for threat and excessive arousal (Robinson et al., 2013b). We now show that 
it is also marked by excessive behavioral inhibition, which has previously been suggested as an 
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underlying cause of anxiety disorders (Quay, 1988). Second, one of the objectives of RDoC is to 
identify neurobiological dimensions of dysfunction that characterize psychiatric disorders. We 
propose that response inhibition is an important behavioral component that can inform our 
understanding of clinical anxiety. Future studies should examine whether response inhibition is 
an enduring feature of clinical anxiety or a pre-existing vulnerability and whether strong 
response inhibition tendencies are associated with passive or avoidant behaviors as it has been 
proposed (Kooijmans et al., 2000). 
The present results seem to contradict the prominent view that anxiety impaired a host of 
cognitive functions, including cognitive control and inhibition (Ansari et al., 2008, Derakshan et 
al., 2009, Eysenck et al., 2007). However, this view needs to be revisited.  First, inhibition 
reflects an umbrella of concepts (Bari and Robbins, 2013). Inhibiting a premotor response and 
inhibiting intrusion from task-irrelevant thought or stimuli (e.g., Stroop effect) relies on distinct 
mechanisms. There is no reason to assume that anxiety would affect these two types of inhibition 
similarly. In addition, in most inhibition studies, anxiety refers to trait anxiety, but trait anxiety is 
different from state anxiety or clinical anxiety. It is important to distinguish among the 
expression of these different forms of anxiety as they may present commonalities but also 
important differences (Bijsterbosch et al., 2015). In fact, most studies do not show a detrimental 
effect of trait anxiety in GNG tasks (Righi et al., 2009, Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). 
This study had strengths and limitations. Among the strengths, the study relied on a within-
subject design with well-established methods of fear induction and measurement (Grillon and 
Baas, 2003, Kaye et al., 2016). In addition, the study was based on strong a priori hypotheses 
from prior studies, and replicated the effect of heightened state anxiety on response inhibition. 
Finally, the anxiety patients were off medication. A limitation was that the safe condition is not 
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fully affectively neutral.  Participation in a study where shocks are administered raises the level 
of state anxiety even when shocks are not imminent.  It is therefore possible, that anxiety caused 
by the threatening context was responsible for the group difference in performance observed in 
this study.  However, one could argued that if this contextual anxiety was responsible for the 
performance difference between the controls and the patients in the safe condition, the patients 
should have been even more affected by the much greater anxiety evoked by the actual shock 
threat in the threat condition. We could have then expected the two groups to show differential 
performance over the safe and threat conditions, a result which was not obtained. Nevertheless, 
future studies should examine response inhibition in anxiety patients in a non-threatening 
context. Another limitation was that the anxiety patients were not homogeneous with regard to 
diagnosis. However, our approach was consistent with current conceptualization of mental 
disorders (Insel et al., 2010). In addition, there was no performance difference among the anxiety 
groups (Supplementary Materials, Table 1s). Finally, the small number of males, reflective of the 
clinical prevalence - prevented us from testing for sex differences.  
To conclude, heightened state anxiety shifts motor action tendencies towards increased 
response inhibition, improving individuals’ ability to stop motor responses. Clinical anxiety is 
characterized by excessive response inhibition tendencies, which lead to inappropriate stopping. 
These results have clinical implications. Discovery of clinical biological phenotypes is a key step 
in improving clinical classification and identifying pathophysiological mechanisms that could be 
targeted for treatment development. This study suggests that increased response inhibition may 
be a clinical phenotype of anxiety disorders. The study of response inhibition in anxiety as a state 
(Hagenaars et al., 2014, Wright et al., 2014) or a disorder is in its infancy. However, there is 
substantial knowledge of the underlying mechanisms of response inhibition in healthy 
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individuals. This knowledge provides a benchmark to identify underlying dysfunction associated 
with pathological anxiety. 
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Table 1 
Demographic information and shock intensity 
 Age State 
anxietya 
Trait 
anxietyb 
BDIc Shock 
Intensityd 
Healthy 
participants 
30.0 (1.2) 25.9 (1.1) 28.8 (1.1) .8 (.3) 2.9 (.2) 
Anxiety 
patients 
28.1 (1.2) 43.6 (1.8) 52.3 (1.5) 8.7 (1.3) 2.8 (.1) 
a State portion and b trait portion of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) 
and c Beck Depression Inventory# (Beck and Steer, 1987); a in mA. 
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Table 2  
Mean (sem) performance scores  
 Healthy participants  Anxiety patients  
 Safe Threat Safe Threat 
nogo correct 
omissiona 
.76 (.02) .80 (.02) .76 (.01)  .81 (.02) 
go correct hitb .91 (.01) .90 (.01) .87 (.01) .87 (.02) 
go RT (msec) c 387.8 (16.2)  377.4 (14.7) 337.3 (10.7) 332.2 (10.9) 
Skill indexd 2.1 (.07) 2.3 (.08) 2.3 (.07) 2.5 (.08) 
go RT variabilitye 148.4 (10.0) 133.4 (9.8) 124.9 (8.8) 105.1 (7.3) 
go RT coefficient 
of variationf 
.38 (.02) .35 (.02) .36 (.02) .31 (.02) 
a Nogo trials followed by no button press; b Go trials followed by button press; c RT to 
correct button press to go trials; d 1000*(mean nogo accuracy ratio/ mean go-trial RT) (Saucedo 
Marquez et al., 2013, Seli, 2016, Seli et al., 2016). e Go RT standard error. f standard 
deviation/mean RT to go trials. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Schematic description of stimulus presentation (sequence 2). There were four 
sequences of predetermined order of stimulus presentation (see text). Each sequence consisted of 
eight blocks with alternating blocks of safe and threat conditions. Sequences started with either 
two task blocks or two no task block followed by two blocks of the alternating task condition 
(i.e., task -> no task -> task -> no task or no task -> task -> no task -> task). Each subject was 
presented with two sequences of stimulus order. Each block consisted of 45 go, 5 nogo, and 3 
acoustic startle stimuli. In addition, one shock was given in two out of the four threat blocks per 
sequence. Finally, at the end of each block, subjects had to retrospectively rate their anxiety and 
select one type of thought with choices of task-related thoughts (TRTs), task-unrelated/threat 
unrelated thoughts (nonthreatTUTs), and threat-related thoughts (threatTUTs) (see 
Supplementary Materials). 
 
Figure 2. Signal-detection sensitivity (dL) and response bias (CL) scores in the two groups in the 
safe and threat conditions. Error bars are sem. * for significant (p<.05) overall group difference; 
# for significant (p=.001) difference between the safe and threat conditions across groups. 
 
Figure 3. Startle magnitude (top) and subjective anxiety (bottom) in each condition in the two 
groups. Difference is difference scores threat minus safe (fear-potentiated startle). Error bars are 
sem. * for a significant (p<.05) greater fear-potentiated startle in the patients compared to the 
control group; # for a significant (p<.05) greater fear-potentiated startle in no task compared to 
GNG task; ^ for significant (p<.05) greater overall subjective anxiety in the patients compared to 
the control group. 
